General Omar Bradley of the United States once famously said, "Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics."

Agreeing with this, the legendary Marshal Georgi Zhukov also stated, "Logistics is more than half the victory

However, the importance of logistics in warfare was recognized by military theorists long before World War II.

One of the oldest surviving military treatises, "The Art of War" by Sun Tzu, in Chapter 2 "Waging War," writes: The general principle of using troops in warfare is that when you mobilize a thousand chariots, a thousand heavy wagons, and an army of a hundred thousand, supplying provisions from a thousand miles away, the cost at the front and rear, the expenses for entertaining guests and envoys, and the maintenance and replenishment amount to a thousand gold pieces, only then can an army of a hundred thousand be launched. Using such a massive force requires a quick victory. If prolonged, the army will tire, morale will decline; besieging fortified cities will exhaust combat strength, and long campaigns abroad can strain a nation's finances. If the army is fatigued and morale low, even the most talented and wise cannot salvage the situation. Therefore, in warfare, one only hears of swift victories having some flaws but never of prolonged conflicts benefiting the state.

From Sun Tzu's era, war has always been an expensive affair. Historical statistics indicate that, under total war conditions, a nation must use 40-60% of its GDP in the same year to fuel the war machine. This does not even account for the physical infrastructure damage and, more terrifyingly, the demographic catastrophe that might be irreversible. However, this article will not discuss the consequences of war.

Force Ratio

Since Sun Tzu's time, theorists have recognized one of the crucial factors determining the success of military operations: the force ratio. Experience and war statistics from East to West, past to present, have set a standard that every infantry tactician must memorize: "The force ratio to launch a successful offensive is 3:1."

Much can be said about this 3:1 ratio. For example, before the 1953-1954 dry season, the total French forces in Vietnam numbered 445,000, while the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) had only 252,000. Yet, at Dien Bien Phu, the PAVN achieved a 3:1 force ratio against the clustered French defenses. To assemble such an "iron fist," logistics played a crucial role.

Take the example of Dien Bien Phu (where the logistics miracles of our heroic ancestors could fill books). Considering the basic logistics need of an army - food (specifically, rice). The French calculated that from Region 5 (Thanh Hoa - Nghe An provinces) to Dien Bien Phu, a porter carrying 20 kg of rice would arrive with only 5 kg. Assuming a soldier needs 500 grams of rice daily; the necessary PAVN force to attack Dien Bien Phu was 45,000; and the campaign lasted 30 days. Thus, the rice needed to be transported, not accounting for losses and spoilage, was 2,700 tons. Transporting 2,700 tons of rice on foot over nearly a month's journey made the French confident that the Viet Minh couldn't launch a significant campaign at Dien Bien Phu due to... lack of rice.

The French's assessment was scientifically based, as they faced the Viet Minh - an unmechanized military force. With malnourished, illiterate peasants, the French believed a series of logistical problems, from road-building, preparing essentials, ammunition transport, was impossible. However, as President Ho Chi Minh wrote: "... Difficult as it may be, the people will complete it."

I particularly love this quote about the logistics miracle named Dien Bien Phu: "The French could not have imagined that what would kick them out of Indochina was 30,000 bicycles - a product of their own 'development' in Indochina." With bicycles, the rice two porters could carry to Dien Bien Phu increased from 40 kg to 200 kg. Thus, the food loss rate was reduced, and the time to fill warehouses was significantly shortened. Thereby, the logistical impossibility for the Dien Bien Phu campaign was solved.

The Unending Flow

Concluding World War II, Soviet leader J. Stalin famously said, "... The Soviet Union does not lack blood." Another famous quote from this time, attributed to Joseph Stalin, is: "The death of one man is a tragedy, but the death of a million is a statistic." These quotes reflect the brutality of World War II, but from a military perspective, we must ask: "Where do you get a million soldiers from?"

The Unending Flow

Concluding World War II, Soviet leader J. Stalin famously said, "... The Soviet Union does not lack blood." Another famous quote from this time, attributed to Joseph Stalin, is: "The death of one man is a tragedy, but the death of a million is a statistic." These quotes reflect the brutality of World War II, but from a military perspective, we must ask: "Where do you get a million soldiers from?"

With a population over 100 million, Soviet war planners had no trouble finding a million men. However, moving a million people from the vast, rugged Soviet Union with its harsh weather (especially in winter) quickly to battlefields 5,000-6,000 km away was a logistical challenge.

Enter the optimal Soviet transport solution in WWII: the "victory trains." With superior speed and cargo capacity, railways were the hot, continuous arteries feeding the Soviet war machine. Not just personnel, but on these non-stop day-night trains, ammunition, food, medicine, weapons, tanks, etc., were continuously delivered to the front.

With the railway's success in WWII, most Soviet weapon systems were standardized for rail transport. We see this today with the Russian army using trains to transport T-54 tanks. If a 3:1 ratio doesn't guarantee victory, a 5:1 or 10:1 ratio might. As Chinese web novels often write: "Before absolute strength, all schemes are useless." With unlimited logistical support, the current example being the Russian army's overwhelming artillery usage against Ukraine, "more than half the victory" seems predetermined.

Logistics is Not Everything

According to game theory, war is an endless game where the first to quit loses. War tests not just economy and logistics but also the will of each combatant.

Vietnam could complete its resistance against the U.S. with extremely limited logistics compared to America's modern, robust supply chains. Despite higher casualties, the defeated were the "rich army" across the ocean.

Americans failed because they couldn't tolerate Vietnam's losses.

In military circles, it's often said: "The U.S. military will retreat if losses reach 5% of forces." Statistics and American interventions support this "folklore."

When Defense Secretary McNamara's computers optimistically predicted America's victory in Vietnam, the 1968 Tet Offensive shocked them with unexpected casualties, leading to a draft lottery. This opened opportunities for peace talks between Vietnam and the U.S.

America's political system, conscription policies, and internal social factors make human losses taboo in its expeditions. But in a total war, defending America, the story would differ. American anti-war sentiment and global solidarity were crucial in Vietnam's great victory.

Conclusion

From ancient times, it was said: "One soldier, three porters." Ensuring war's outcome, a proportional logistics force is vital. Modern tanks, planes are just scrap without fuel. "The future of war" like UAVs, UGVs, USVs are useless if not delivered to the right place, time, and person (or simply run out of... battery).

Yet, war isn't just an endurance contest of economies or logistics. "The Americans lost because they didn't understand Vietnam" - before a life-and-death struggle of a nation, with just "bare feet" and "bamboo spears," the iron will of a people can render numerical superiority meaningless.